David Cooper
After Psychiatry
and anti-psychiatry, Cooper (1971) wrote The
death of the family. He wanted liberation from the family, which he
saw as an ideological conditioning device that reinforces the power of the ruling
class in an exploitative society. A commune of people living closely together,
either under the same roof or in a more diffused network, was seen as a
potential alternative form of micro-social organisation. For Cooper, the
meaning of revolution in the first world was a "radical dissolution of
false egoic structures in which one is brought up to
experience oneself". The urban guerrilla war may need to be fought with molatov cocktails, but spontaneous self-assertion of full
personal autonomy should be seen in itself as a decisive act of counterviolence against the system.
As pointed out by
Laing, Cooper's form of revolution was a "surreal distillate" (Mullan, 1995). Cooper was a member of the South African
Communist Party and was sent to Poland and China to be trained as a
professional revolutionary. He never returned to South Africa because he was
known by South African intelligence and was frightened he would be killed.
His next book, The grammar of living, made clear that Cooper
(1974) was continuing his revolutionary work on self and society. He noted that
some of the contents of the book were learnt during periods of incarceration.
He viewed The death of the family as
largely a revolt against first-world values, but The grammar of living,
he thought, merited a rather cooler reception. The blurb on the front cover
flap, however, warned that many would still find the book offensive and
obscene. Cooper described the conditions for a good voyage on LSD. He argued
for liberation of an orgasmic ecstasy and believed that initiation of young
children into orgasmic experiences would become part of a full education. In
principle he could not exclude sexual relations from therapy. Nor could he ever
submit to the gross or subtle injunctions of bourgeois society, by which he
meant essentially the classical Marxist conception of the "bourgeoisie
being the ruling class in a fully developed capitalist society that rules or
rather misrules and exploits through its ownership of the means of
production".
In the book, Cooper
(1974) made an attempt to define anti-psychiatry. He saw it as reversing the
rules of the psychiatric game of labelling and then systematically destroying
people by making them obedient robots. The roles of patient and professional in
a commune may be abolished through reversal. With the right people, who have
themselves been through profound regression, attentive non-interference may
open up experience rather than close it down. To go back and relive our lives
is natural and necessary and the society that prevents it must be terminated.
The subversive nature of anti-psychiatry includes radical sexual liberation.
The anti-psychiatrist must give up financial and family security and be
prepared to enter his/her own madness, perhaps even to the point of social
invalidation. Cooper never hid his zealous fanaticism.
The language of
madness (Cooper, 1980)
allowed the madman in Cooper to address the madmen in us "in the hope that
the former madman speaks clearly or loudly enough for the latter to hear".
He talked about the time when he was literally temporarily mad, deluded about
being extra-terrestrial and believing that extra-terrestrial beings, appointed
from another region in the cosmos, were amongst us. He continued to express his
view that madness is the "destructuring of the
alienated structures of existence and the restructuring of a less alienated way
of being". His theme of 'orgasmic politics' was repeated, not so much to
emphasis biological aspects as did Wilhelm Reich, but to see orgasm in revolutionary,
political terms. As far as he was concerned, non-psychiatry was coming into
being. By this he meant that "'mad' behaviour is
to be contained, incorporated in and diffused though the whole society as a
subversive source of creativity, spontaneity, not 'disease'". This state
of non-psychiatry without mental illness or psychiatry could only be reached in
a transformed, genuinely socialist society.
Laing's comment on the
work of Cooper is pertinent: "I [Laing] never found anything that he
[Cooper] wrote of any particular use to me; in fact, I found it a bit
embarrassing" (Mullan, 1995). Although Laing
& Cooper (1964) wrote an exposition together in english of Sartrean terms
related to dialectical rationality, they were independent characters. Laing
enjoyed Cooper's state of mind, but he repeatedly denied he was an 'anti-psychiatrist', hence distancing himself from
Cooper's excesses. Esterson (1976), too, made clear
that, as far as he was concerned, Sanity, madness and the family was
not an anti-psychiatric text. In fact, he saw anti-psychiatry, by which he
meant the writings of Cooper and also of Laing, to the extent that he went
along with Cooper, as a movement that had done enormous damage to the struggle
against coercive, traditional psychiatry.
Cooper's excursion
into family, sexual and revolutionary politics could be said to detract from
his criticism of psychiatry. However, this critique continued to underpin his
writings and was restated in a speech entitled 'What is schizophrenia?' to the
Japanese Congress of Neurology and Psychiatry in Tokyo, May 1975, published as
an appendix to The language of madness.
As far as Cooper was concerned, schizophrenia does not exist as a
disease-entity in the ordinary medico-nosological
sense. However, madness does exist and deviant behaviour that becomes
sufficiently incomprehensible becomes stigmatised as schizophrenia. Here Cooper
seems to build on the standard notion of psychosis as 'un-understandable'
(Jaspers, 1963), at least for the social process of identification of mental
illness, even though he personally thinks it is misguided to pathologise such behaviour. Following Foucault (1965),
Cooper saw madness as only excluded from society after the European
renaissance, controlled on behalf of the new bourgeois state. Schizophrenia
must be understood as interpersonal. It, therefore, has a semantic reality even
if it does not exist as a nosological entity. It is
also the label for a certain social role.
Cooper, D.
(1971) The death of the family. Harmondsworth:
Penguin
Cooper, D.
(1974) The grammar of living. London: Allen Lane
Cooper, D.
(1980) The language of madness. Harmondsworth:
Pelican
Esterson, A. (1976) Anti-psychiatry. [Letter] The New Review, 3: 70-1
Mullan, B. (1995) Mad to be normal. Conversations with R.D.
Laing. London: Free Association